Who Should Get a Say?
Race, Law Enforcement Guidelines, and Systems of Representation

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Abstract: African Americans are disproportionately likely to have negative, even deadly, interactions with the police. As a result, some have argued that the African-American community should play a special role in revising law-enforcement guidelines. Yet African Americans constitute a numeric minority, raising a fundamental question about democratic governance: should groups disproportionately impacted by a policy change be given greater input during that bill’s drafting? We investigate how the public thinks about this question using a national survey experiment to test rival theories concerning public reactions: one rooted in general norms regarding procedural fairness, implying opposition to disproportionate influence; and the other grounded in group-centric theories of public opinion, implying a conditional response. Results suggest that many citizens support deviations from procedural political equality, but that that approval is conditioned by racial resentment. Increasingly strained inter-group dynamics are thus likely to stoke case-by-case disagreement on even basic questions of democratic governance.

Key words: law enforcement reforms; policy input; representation; public consultations; public opinion; racial resentment; police misconduct; United States.
A disproportionate number of African Americans have negative, and sometimes deadly, interactions with the police (Baumgartner, Epp, and Shoub 2018; Jones 2017; Weitzer 2015). The prominence of movements such as “Black Lives Matters” has motivated politicians and governmental officials to consider potential remedies to this policy problem. One suggested route toward improving this situation is to offer the African-American community greater input in processes amending police guidelines (Walker 2016). Such proposals, however, may run into two sources of resistance from the public. On the one hand, giving certain groups more voice than others may conflict with basic conceptions of democratic legitimacy, wherein the disparate voices of citizens should be equally weighted (Dahl 1971; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). On the other, policing policy is highly politicized, with the public divided along both partisan and racial lines (Fingerhut 2017; Nadal et al. 2017; Silver and Pickett 2015). Offering African Americans special input is therefore liable to prove controversial.

This case raises fundamental questions about democratic politics. Policy problems often impact societal groups unequally and politicians may thus be incentivized to pay special attention to sub-groups within their constituency.¹ In such cases, we can contrast two principles for how public input should be incorporated into the policymaking process. First, there is what we label “procedural input equality,” wherein all citizens should be offered equal opportunities for input (e.g., Dahl 1971). Second, there is what we call “substantive input equality,” wherein opportunities for input, and hence influence, should reflect the degree to which a citizen is

¹ Politicians often hold specialized town hall meetings with social groups in order to cultivate a positive impression among group members as well as to gather information from them (Fenno 1978). Examples abound both in the US and abroad. In America, the two most characteristic variants of this phenomenon are arguably “Seniors Town Halls” (e.g., https://www.facebook.com/events/649613102068949/) and “Veterans Fairs” (e.g., https://lipinski.house.gov/seniors/rep-lipinski-invites-third-district-residents-to-upcoming-town-hall-meeting-veterans-fair-and-senior-fairs-june-15-2018/) – but these are far from the only groups consulted by politicians (see, for example, https://www.wmfd.com/news/single.asp?story=76837 or https://www.kitsapdailynews.com/news/indigenous-millennials-share-their-views-with-members-of-congress/).
affected by a policy (e.g., Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010; Mansbridge 2003, 524). Our focus is on how the public thinks about these competing ideals. More specifically, this study examines public reactions to (1) proposals to offer the African-American community extra input on the issue of police violence and (2) the politicians who hold and promote these sorts of consultative measures. Understanding public reactions is crucial given that public opinion impacts politicians’ behavior (Soroka and Wlezien 2005) and hence may influence the likelihood that politicians pursue substantive (rather than procedural) input equality, both in general and on this specific case.

Two theoretical approaches inform our study. First, some scholars argue that people evaluate the fairness of decision-making procedures according to their impartiality and the extent to which a representative array of voices were consulted (Blader and Tyler 2003; Bøggild 2016; Doherty and Wolak 2012; Gangl 2003; Hibbing and Alford 2004). From this perspective, we would expect individuals to reject policymaking procedures that give disproportionate influence to particular subgroups. Yet, given that studies in this vein have tended to abstract away from the specific group(s) being granted voice, such a conclusion seems premature. We thus build on the procedural fairness literature by drawing from a second body of work that suggests attitudes towards public policies tend to be group-centric in nature – i.e., based on perceptions of whether a policy aids or hinders the interests of liked and disliked societal groups (Conover 1988; Converse 1964; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Nicholson 2011; Sniderman et al. 1991). From this perspective we would expect responses to be contingent on group-centered considerations, such as feelings toward the group being given extra input, the individual’s own group affiliations, and/or the group membership of the politician proposing the consultation.
To carry out our investigation, we fielded a survey experiment of the US public wherein we randomly varied the content of a politician’s consultative proposal (the constituency in general versus the local African-American community) as well as the group attributes of the politician (race and partisanship). Ultimately, the results of our experiment suggest the value of incorporating group-centric considerations into evaluations of procedural fairness, as we find little evidence of a generalized norm against deviations from procedural input equality. Respondents, on average, did not evaluate a proposal for special attentiveness to the African-American community, nor the politician making it, significantly worse than when the politician proposed to treat all constituents equally by consulting the entire community. Opinions instead polarized according to respondents’ feelings towards African Americans. What is more, these variations in respondents’ procedural preferences largely transcend questions of the proposing politician’s partisanship. The fact that we find these results even with law enforcement guideline reforms – a broadly contested and politicized policy issue – is striking, and we discuss the implications of our findings both for African American-police relations and for theories of procedural fairness and partisanship in the conclusion.

Theory

Politicians sometimes choose to deviate from the principle of procedural input equality – which highlights the importance of identical treatment – in order to pursue substantive input equality – which requires accounting for underlying, contextually-defined differences. How should we expect members of the mass public to react to such efforts, both generally and with regard to our specific case? While there is clearly a good deal of research debating the existence of sub-group inequalities in representation concerning policy outputs (e.g., Clifford 2012; Enns 2015; Gilens and Page 2014; Griffin and Newman 2008), there is much less work concerning
public reactions, particularly when it comes to disproportionate input (but see DeScioli and Bokemper n.d. for a recent exception). Below we build on two existing theoretical approaches to generate expectations about public reactions to granting African Americans greater input over police guideline reforms.

**Procedural Fairness Theory**

Citizens may evaluate leaders and governments according to whether these actors deliver desired policy outcomes (Ansolabehere and Jones 2010). However, this is not the sole criterion for many citizens: the process used to reach a given decision often plays a role as well. Many Americans appear to obtain generally desired policy outcomes yet distrust and dislike governing institutions because of negative beliefs about the policymaking process (Cramer 2016; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Ramirez 2009). Likewise, individuals are generally more willing to accept decisions they disagree with when the procedures that produced them are considered fair (Esaiasson 2010; Gangl 2003; Tyler 2006) and are more likely to reject unfairly produced outcomes, even when they directly benefit from them (Bøggild 2016; Hibbing and Alford 2004). While debates continue concerning the relative impact of procedures versus policy agreement in generating legitimacy beliefs (Doherty and Wolak 2012; Esaisson et al. n.d.), procedural assessments significantly influence resulting beliefs and behaviors.

Fair procedures generate more positive reactions than unfair ones. This raises an important question: what makes a procedure fair? This question has been explored extensively under the rubric of procedural fairness theory (Blader and Tyler 2003; Bøggild 2016; Bøggild and Petersen 2016; Doherty and Wolak 2012; Gangl 2003; Tyler 2006). Two components of fair procedures are particularly relevant here. First, representativeness matters: decision-making procedures that are dominated by a small group of people rather than all relevant groups should
be considered unfair (Gangl 2003). Thus, political procedures based on public input may be considered more fair than those that foreclose it (Doherty and Wolak 2012). Second, the impartiality of decision makers matters: biased decision makers undermine perceptions of procedural fairness and, consequently, decision acceptance (Bøggild 2016; Hibbing and Alford 2004). Insofar as consulted groups are perceived to (a) be biased toward a certain outcome and (b) have played a decisive role in policy formulation, we might expect such a mechanism to similarly shape reactions to the pursuit of substantive (rather than procedural) input equality. These two components of procedural fairness thus imply a clear expectation: the public should react negatively to efforts by politicians to give special weight to African Americans when they formulate police guideline reforms.

**H1**: People should evaluate proposals and politicians giving disproportionate influence to African Americans negatively, all else being equal

*Group-Centrism and Public Opinion*

So far, we have assumed that general conceptions of fairness will be the overriding factor affecting how people respond to calls for, and actual instances of, disproportional group influence. Yet there are good reasons to doubt that principles will dominate peoples’ reactions. As the literature on political tolerance has highlighted, people may well be inclined to set aside generalized norms when told which precise groups will either benefit or be harmed by a decision (Grant and Rudolph 2003; Petersen et al. 2011; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1983). This possibility is largely absent, however, in existing political science research on procedural fairness. Doherty and Wolak (2012), for instance, vary the fairness of a decision-making procedure via information about whether citizens were able to give input about the policy before the decision or not; who gave the input, by contrast, is left undiscussed. This shortcoming
prevents us from being able to disentangle attitudinal effects induced by consultation method (e.g., driven by a preference for procedural input equality) from those induced by opinions about those who are being consulted (e.g., driven by racial resentment).

These observations suggest an important factor that might shape reactions to the pursuit of substantive input equality: the groups involved. Many citizens exhibit little interest in, and knowledge about, political matters (Converse 2000; Prior 2018). People can nevertheless obtain a desired level of confidence in their opinions by looking for decision shortcuts (Chaiken 1980; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Feelings toward the social groups implicated in a political debate are a preeminent shortcut for decision making, as group cues activate group identities, motivate group-based thinking, and enable efficient inferences regarding the consequences of a policy (Conover 1988; Converse 1964; Huddy 2013; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Nicholson 2011).

Group-centric thinking may be stimulated by the group(s) given disproportionate influence as well as by the identity markers of the politician(s) advancing such consultative measures. We expect that two specific groups will matter when it comes to the African-American community’s input on police regulations. First, race – that of the consulted group as well as that of the politician proposing the consultation – should be a key factor shaping responses. A vast body of research suggests that people’s feelings toward racial groups, and particularly African Americans, affect their evaluations of policies and politicians (Piston 2010; Rabinowitz et al. 2009; Tesler 2012). A substantial racial divide also emerges when looking specifically at attitudes regarding policing and criminal justice (Cullen et al. 1996; Fingerhut 2017; Nadal et al. 2017; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). This racial divide likely extends to the consultation process itself. On the one hand, individuals with negative attitudes toward African Americans may be likely to deride attempts to increase the political influence of this group as
“pandering.” This is perhaps especially likely when the politician making the proposal is African American, as this may raise worries of “group favoritism” in ensuing policy outputs (Goldman 2017; Hill 2009; Swain 2018). On the other hand, those with more positive attitudes toward African Americans may see such efforts as necessary correctives to a purely procedural approach to democratic equality. Granting increased input to the African-American population could be seen as a means to correct historical inequities in democratic influence (Krimmel and Rader 2015) and/or to protect a small, vulnerable group whose voice would be overwhelmed under simple majoritarian rule (DeScioli and Bokemper n.d.).

**H2a:** As an individual’s racial resentment increases, they should evaluate proposals and politicians that give disproportionate influence to African Americans more negatively, all else being equal

**H2b:** As an individual’s racial resentment increases, they should evaluate proposals and politicians that give disproportionate influence to African Americans more negatively when the politician is black rather than white, all else being equal

Second, the politician’s *party* should matter. We expect partisanship to matter in two ways. First, we hypothesize that partisans will be more “forgiving” of a deviation from procedural equality when a co-partisan politician is promoting it. Whereas endorsements by co-partisans motivate partisans to adopt in-group norms, positions adopted by opposing partisans are treated with suspicion – especially given the heavy patina of distrust that currently animates US partisan politics (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018; Leeper and Slothuus 2014). Second, we expect the effect of co-partisanship to be particularly important in understanding reactions among Republican respondents. Specifically, we assume that Republicans will be less inclined to give African Americans greater influence over police guidelines either for reasons tied specifically to African Americans (e.g., higher racial
resentment; Abramowitz and Webster 2018) or due to issue-specific attitudes (Fingerhut 2017; Reinka and Leach 2017). For Republicans, having a co-partisan propose the consultation may be an important balm against potentially disagreeable policy outputs. Democrats, by contrast, should be more likely to react positively to the proposal regardless of the politician’s party affiliation. As such, we expect that co-partisanship will matter more for Republicans than for Democrats. Taking these points together leads us to our final hypotheses.

**H3a:** Individuals should evaluate proposals giving disproportionate influence to African Americans more positively when the politician proposing it is a co-partisan, all else being equal

**H3b:** Proposal evaluations of Republican identifiers should be more impacted by co-partisanship than those of Democratic identifiers, all else being equal

**Study Design**

We fielded a survey experiment to test our hypotheses. We recruited 2,250 American adults from Qualtrics’ panel in July 2018, with quotas on age and gender to ensure representativeness on these variables (reflecting census data). Our sample is broadly representative of the American mass public in terms of its demographic and political characteristics as seen in Table OA1 in the Supplementary Materials.

Respondents read a vignette describing a proposal by a politician to deal with the issue of police misconduct in his local community, described in such a way as to broadly reflect the national contours of the problem. The vignette read by respondents always began as follows:

Imagine a city called Everytown, USA. Black people in Everytown make up about 13% of the population, but they are disproportionately more likely to have negative interactions with the local police. These interactions range from more frequent traffic stops to higher rates of being killed by the police.
The remainder of the vignette featured three randomized elements: Politician Race (African American or White), Politician Partisanship (Democrat or Republican), and Consultation Treatment (General vs. African Americans). We followed previous work by randomizing the politician’s race via his name, with respondents reading either about a politician named DeShawn Jackson or Jake Mueller (Butler and Broockman 2011; Butler and Homola 2017). The partisanship manipulation is straightforward: the politician was described as either Republican or Democratic.

The consultation treatment, meanwhile, varied whom the politician gathers input from concerning the issue of police misconduct. In the General Consultation treatment, the politician focuses attention on the community as a whole:

[DeShawn Jackson / Jake Mueller], a local [Republican / Democratic] politician, has a proposal he thinks could help: he wants to work together with local residents to develop new police guidelines. Jake feels that it would be wrong to draw up new guidelines without getting input from the town’s population as a whole. Even though that means the local black population might end up not agreeing with the final policy, for Jake, “black residents shouldn’t get more of a say just because they’re the ones most affected by the issue.” To put his proposal into action, Jake has recently held a town hall meeting with community leaders and everyday residents from the local community.

The politician in this treatment advances a conception of public input that prioritizes procedural equality, i.e., each member of the community is offered an equal opportunity to provide input (Clifford 2012; Dahl 1971). Note also that this proposal is both impartial (i.e. no
one side has a necessary advantage) and representative (i.e. the community as a whole has an opportunity to voice its opinion).

The politician in the African-American Consultation treatment, meanwhile, prioritizes the input of the African-American community. The corresponding text read as follows, with elements that varied from the General Consultation treatment italicized here for added emphasis:

[DeShawn Jackson / Jake Mueller], a local [Republican / Democratic] politician, has a proposal he thinks could help: he wants to work together with local black residents to develop new police guidelines. Jake feels that it would be wrong to draw up new guidelines without getting input from the town’s black population. Even though that means the local population as a whole might end up not agreeing with the final policy, for Jake, “black residents should get more of a say since they’re the ones most affected by the issue.” To put his proposal into action, Jake has recently held a town hall meeting with community leaders and everyday residents from the black community. [italics added]

The focus here is on pursuing a substantive conception of input equality, with citizen influence benchmarked to the effects of the underlying policy problem (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010). Yet from a standard procedural fairness (and democratic) perspective, this input process suffers from two primary faults: it is both less impartial, as one side of the debate is given greater weight, and unrepresentative, since citizen input is narrow rather than widespread. If the norm-based logic highlighted by the procedural fairness literature is enough to explain reactions, we should see evaluations that are more negative when respondents read the African-American Consultation vignette versus the General Consultation one.

We asked respondents three items to assess their reactions to the vignettes. First, we enquired about their level of support for the consultation proposal in the vignette on a 0 (completely disagree) to 10 (completely agree) scale (mean = 5.61, st.dev = 2.94). We then asked two items specifically about the politician described in the vignette: (1) how much they would
support or oppose the politician as a candidate for office (0 = strongly oppose, 10 = strongly support); (2) and whether the politician would be “very helpful, somewhat helpful, or not very helpful to you” if they “had a problem that [the politician] could do something about” (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984). These two items are strongly correlated (r = 0.63). In our analysis below, we thus focus on an index that combines them (M=0, SD = 1) with positive scores indicating above average evaluations of the politician.²

To uncover potential heterogeneity in responses to these treatments, we also measured (1) attitudes towards African Americans and (2) respondent partisanship. We included several race-related measures on the pre-test (which was separated from the experiment via a different experiment on another topic). We asked respondents to evaluate African Americans on a 0-100 feeling thermometer (as well as politicians, low-income Americans, and the police). We also asked them to indicate how much political influence African Americans deserve (as well as whites, Latinos, Asians, and low-income Americans). Finally, we included three items typically found on standard racial resentment scales (Loose, Hou, and Berinsky 2018; Rabinowitz et al. 2009): “Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve”; “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice…Blacks should do the same”; and “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class”. We combine these five items into a single index (M=0, SD=1) via factor analysis with higher scores indicating more negative attitudes toward African Americans.³ Partisanship was recorded on the post-test (once again separated by an

² The index is produced via a factor analysis, wherein a single dimension emerges with an eigenvalue over 1 (EV = 1.63) and explains 82% of the variance between the two items.
³ A factor analysis of the five items yields one dimension with an eigenvalue over 1 (EV = 2.37), with this dimension explaining approximately 47% of the variance across the items. Factor loadings range from 0.42 (the thermometer) to 0.84 (“blacks have gotten less than they deserve”).
experiment on a different topic) via the standard ANES branching format, with 42% of respondents indicating that they are Democrats (including leaners), 17% saying they are (pure) Independents, and 40% saying they are Republican.

**Results**

*Did the African-American Consultation Proposal Lead to Worse Evaluations? No.*

In Hypothesis 1 we built on research conducted under the rubric of procedural fairness theory to argue that proposals to give disproportionate weight to African Americans (at the expense of the broader community) would be negatively received. However, our experimental results do not support this conclusion. Instead, respondents reported more positive evaluations of both the substantive input equality proposal and the politician proposing it. For instance, the mean for the proposal evaluation item in the General Consultation treatment is 5.47 [95% CI: 5.30, 5.63] compared to 5.76 [5.58, 5.94] in the African-American Consultation condition. Likewise, the politician was evaluated more favorably when proposing to give African Americans disproportionate attention (0.08 [0.02, 0.14]) than when not (-0.08 [-0.14, -0.03]. These differences are statistically significant, albeit modest in scope with Cohen’s $d$ statistics of 0.10 and 0.16 respectively.\(^4\) Nevertheless, we can see a clear deviation from the logic suggested by procedural fairness theory, with no general preference for procedural (over substantive) input equality.

Figure 1 further unpacks the effect of the consultation treatment by plotting the mean evaluations given to the proposal and the politician making it, with responses broken down by the politician’s race and partisanship. Two notable results emerge. First, in no condition are

\[^4\] T-test results for the two measures are as follows: (1) Proposal Evaluation: $t_{2240} = 2.34, p < 0.05$; (2) Politician Evaluation: $t_{2240} = 3.87, p < 0.001$. 
**Figure 1**: Mean Evaluations by Treatment Condition

**Notes**: Circular markers provide the mean in the experimental treatment group with 95% confidence intervals. The left-hand figures focus on evaluations of the proposal, while the right-hand figure focuses on evaluations of the politician. Figures in the top row focus on the white politician by his partisanship, while the bottom row focuses on the African-American politician by his partisanship.

Evaluations more negative in the African-American consultation treatment than in the General Consultation treatment. Second, the *positive* effect of the Consult African Americans treatment is driven entirely by responses to the white politician. The difference between the consultation treatment conditions is positive in all four comparisons involving a white politician and significant in three, whereas all of the comparisons involving an African-American politician are
positive but too small and noisy to reliably differentiate from zero. The magnitude of these differences are modest in scope, with Cohen’s $d$ ranging from a low of 0.09 (White Democrat, Proposal Evaluation) to a high of 0.27 (White Democrat, Politician Evaluation). Ultimately, although we find scant evidence that respondents reacted negatively to deviations from procedural input equality, fairness concerns could nevertheless still be lurking in the background: given that we find consultation effects only when the politician was white, respondents may have made a distinction between “altruistic” consultations (helping another subgroup) and potentially self-interested ones (helping one’s own subgroup). The next section investigates this possibility.

Race-Related Heterogeneity in Responses

In Hypotheses 2a and 2b we argued that group-centric considerations would shape responses to deviations from procedural input equality. First, we expected that attitudes toward the consulted group should moderate reactions, with increasingly negative evaluations in the face of higher negativity toward African Americans. Models 1 and 2 in Table 1 provide a test of this claim via OLS models predicting our two dependent variables based on an indicator for the consultation treatment (1 = Consult African Americans), attitudes toward African Americans (M=0, SD=1; higher = more negative evaluations), and their interaction. The top half of Figure 2, meanwhile, provides predicted values of the dependent variables based on these models.

Table 1 and Figure 2 show that race-related attitudes substantially influenced responses to the proposal and the politician making it. On the one hand, there exists a positive relationship between the attitudes measure and the two outcomes in the General Consultation treatment,

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5 Test statistics for the white politician comparisons are as follows. Proposal Evaluation: (1) Republican Legislator – $t_{561} = 2.71, p < 0.01$, (2) Democratic Legislator – $t_{553} = 1.10, p = 0.27$. Politician Evaluation: (1) Republican Legislator – $t_{561} = 2.41, p < 0.05$, (2) Democratic Legislator: $t_{553} = 3.21, p < 0.01$. 
### Table 1. Race-Related Heterogeneity in Evaluations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. Amer.</td>
<td>0.267* (0.117)</td>
<td>0.151*** (0.0393)</td>
<td>0.486** (0.166)</td>
<td>0.237*** (0.0558)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attitudes toward African Americans</td>
<td>0.401*** (0.0835)</td>
<td>0.0432 (0.0280)</td>
<td>0.458*** (0.122)</td>
<td>0.0602 (0.0409)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. Amer. # Attitudes</td>
<td>-1.702*** (0.117)</td>
<td>-0.548*** (0.0393)</td>
<td>-1.883*** (0.174)</td>
<td>-0.571*** (0.0583)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black Politician</td>
<td>0.257 (0.166)</td>
<td>0.105 (0.0556)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. Amer. # Black</td>
<td>-0.427 (0.234)</td>
<td>-0.170* (0.0786)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black # Attitudes</td>
<td>-0.0966 (0.167)</td>
<td>-0.0274 (0.0562)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. Amer. # Black # Attitudes</td>
<td>0.315 (0.236)</td>
<td>0.0364 (0.0791)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.455*** (0.0828)</td>
<td>-0.0829** (0.0278)</td>
<td>5.323*** (0.118)</td>
<td>-0.136*** (0.0394)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2240</td>
<td>2240</td>
<td>2240</td>
<td>2240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.136</td>
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**Notes:** Models are OLS. Attitudes toward African Americans is an index (M=0, SD=1) wherein higher scores indicate more negative evaluations. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

although this relationship is stronger in Model 1 (Proposal Evaluation) than in Model 2 (Politician Evaluation). This positively sloped line, however, reverses direction among respondents in the African-American Consultation treatment condition. Here, the treatment leads to significantly better evaluations among those with positive attitudes toward African Americans (e.g. those below 0 on the scale) while conversely leading to significantly worse evaluations.
Figure 2: Race and Heterogeneity in Evaluations

Notes: Plots in the top half provide the predicted value for the dependent variable by consultation condition and attitudes toward African Americans (x-axis; higher = more negative). Plots in the bottom half provide the difference in evaluations between those in the African American Consultation and General Consultation conditions by politician race (circles = white politician, triangles = Black politician) and attitudes toward African Americans (x-axis). 95% confidence intervals are provided for these estimates.

among those with more negative attitudes (e.g. those above 0). The size of these differences is substantial: respondents at the 10\textsuperscript{th} percentile of the attitudes measure, e.g. those with highly positive attitudes, evaluated the proposal approximately 4.55 [3.94, 5.17] scale points better (on a scale of 0-10) than those at the 90\textsuperscript{th} percentile, e.g. those with highly negative group attitudes. This difference for the politician evaluation measure, meanwhile, is 1.47 [1.26, 1.67] standard deviations in size. This finding reiterates our earlier conclusion that respondents did not respond to the consultation treatment based on generalized norms of fairness, but instead based on group-related considerations.
In Hypothesis 2b, we argued that the race of the politician should further moderate this effect. An African-American politician paying special attention to this community, at the potential expense of non-African Americans, may activate concerns regarding racial group favoritism that will in turn worsen reactions among those predisposed to react negatively (Goldman 2017). We saw some initial evidence in line with this expectation in Figure 1, as we found positive responses when a white politician, but not an African-American one, recommended consulting African Americans. Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 further test this expectation by adding an indicator for the race of the legislator (1=African American) to the model as well as its interaction with the other two included variables. The bottom sub-graphs in Figure 2 plot the marginal effect of the Consult African Americans treatment by the politician’s race and the respondent’s racial attitudes. The results reported in Table 1 and Figure 2 do not support our expectations and, if anything, suggest an inverse relationship. On the one hand, neither three-way interaction term is statistically significant. The effect of the consultation treatment is broadly the same regardless of politician race, and this is true across the full range of attitudes toward African Americans. To the extent that this effect might differ based on the politician’s race, it appears to be principally among those with positive attitudes toward African Americans – though these differences are not statistically significant. Ultimately, we find substantial evidence of group-driven thinking, albeit in the absence of an additional priming effect of the politician’s race.

**Partisan Sources of Heterogeneity in Response**

The final source of heterogeneity that we expect to find concerns partisanship. In Hypothesis 3a we argued that deviations from procedural equality should be forgiven more readily by co-partisans of the legislator making the proposal than by opposing partisans. Models
### Table 2. Partisanship and Evaluations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. American</td>
<td>0.110 (0.195)</td>
<td>0.0476 (0.0667)</td>
<td>-1.247*** (0.275)</td>
<td>-0.325*** (0.0938)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-partisan</td>
<td>0.126 (0.193)</td>
<td>0.0163 (0.0659)</td>
<td>0.0642 (0.269)</td>
<td>0.0189 (0.0920)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. American # Co-partisan</td>
<td>0.242 (0.271)</td>
<td>0.204* (0.0928)</td>
<td>0.526 (0.380)</td>
<td>0.185 (0.130)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Respondent</td>
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<tr>
<td>-0.789** (0.267)</td>
<td>-0.134 (0.0912)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. American # Dem</td>
<td>2.624*** (0.382)</td>
<td>0.721*** (0.130)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-partisan # Dem</td>
<td>0.0887 (0.377)</td>
<td>-0.0109 (0.129)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. American # Co-partisan # Dem</td>
<td>-0.504 (0.531)</td>
<td>0.0498 (0.181)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.524*** (0.137)</td>
<td>-0.0572 (0.0467)</td>
<td>5.936*** (0.193)</td>
<td>0.0126 (0.0659)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>1850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Models are OLS. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

1 and 2 in Table 2 provide a test of this claim by regressing both dependent variables on an indicator of the received consultation treatment, whether the respondent read about a co-partisan or not, and the interaction between these two variables. The top half of Figure 3 then plots the predicted values for the DVs in the African-American Consultation condition by co-partisanship status. Evaluations were indeed more positive among co-partisans than opposing partisans, both
Notes: The top two figures are based on Models 1 & 2 in Table 2. They plot the predicted values for the two dependent variables (with 95% confidence intervals) according to whether the respondent is a co-partisan or opposing partisan to the vignette politician. The bottom two sub-graphs stem from Models 3 & 4 and plot the marginal difference between co-partisans and opposing partisans in the Consults African Americans condition by the respondent’s party identification (with 95% confidence intervals).

Towards the Consult African Americans proposal (difference = 0.37 [-0.01, 0.74]) and towards the politician advancing it (difference = 0.22 [0.09, 0.35]). These differences are notably smaller in the General Consultation treatment condition (proposal difference = 0.13 [-0.25, 0.50]; politician difference = 0.02 [-0.11, 0.15]), although the effect of co-partisanship is only reliably smaller for attitudes toward the politician. Partisans thus appear more willing to countenance a

---

6 A Wald test for the equivalence of the two differences is insignificant for evaluations of the proposal (F = 0.80, p = 0.37), but significant for the politician (F = 4.82, p < 0.05). In other words, in the latter case the effect of co-partisanship was significantly greater in the African-American Consultation treatment than the General Consultation condition.
departure from procedural input equality when a co-partisan recommends it than when a partisan opponent does.

In Hypothesis 3b we argued that partisanship should be particularly important for Republicans in the African-American Consultation treatment. Republicans vary in a number of ways from Democrats, of course, such that we may expect them to be particularly resistant to efforts to give greater influence to African Americans, either generally or on this issue in particular. Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 test this proposition by adding the respondent’s partisanship (1 = Democrat, 0 = Republican) to the model as well as the full set of interactions between the included predictors. The bottom half of Figure 3 then plots the marginal effect of co-partisanship by respondent partisanship for those in the Consult African Americans condition. We do not find evidence in favor of H3b in Table 2 and Figure 3. While the effect of co-partisanship is numerically larger vis-à-vis proposal evaluations, this difference is not itself significant (F = 1.23, p = 0.27). Meanwhile, the impact of co-partisanship does not vary in any noticeable manner with regard to the politician evaluation measure. Finally, note also that the effect of co-partisanship does not appear to vary based on respondent partisanship.

While Table 2 does not show that co-partisanship mattered differently for Republicans and Democrats, it does show that respondent partisanship mattered as a moderator via a positive interaction between consultation treatment and respondent partisanship. Figure 4 elaborates on this interaction by plotting the mean scores given to the politician and his proposal according to the consultation treatment the respondent read, his or her partisanship, and co-partisanship status. Notably, Democratic respondents reacted positively, and Republicans negatively, to the Consult
Figure 4: Mean Evaluations by Respondent PID, Co-Partisanship, and Consultation Treatment

Notes: Markers provide means by consultation treatment with separate subgraphs according to whether the Respondent is a Republican (top) or Democrat (bottom) and co-partisanship status.

African Americans treatment *regardless* of the partisanship of the legislator.\(^7\) Interestingly, although Democrats reported significantly more positive attitudes toward African Americans than Republicans, this difference does not fully account for the patterns seen in Figure 4.\(^8\) In Table OA2 we replicate the interaction between respondent partisanship and consultation treatment while also controlling for our measure of attitudes toward African Americans (and its

---

\(^7\) The politician’s race also did not matter for this relationship.
\(^8\) Recall that higher scores on the measure of attitudes toward African Americans indicates attitudes that are *more negative*. The mean score on this item for Democrats is -0.46 [0.40, 0.52] versus 0.47 [-0.53, -0.41] for Republicans. Suffice it to say, this difference is statistically significant (\(t_{1857} = 22.24, p < 0.0001\)). This difference is consistent with prior work showing a growing divergence in racial attitudes between mass partisans in the US (Abramowitz and Webster 2018).
interaction with the consultation treatment) as well as respondent’s ideological self-identification and their feelings toward the police. In Table OA3 we do the same but now restrict our attention just to white respondents. We still see a role for respondent partisanship, though in this instance it is only present among Democrats. In particular, (white) Democratic respondents still react more favorably to the African-American Consultation treatment than the General Consultation treatment even when controlling for their level of racial resentment, ideology, and attitudes toward the police.9

**Conclusions**

Offering African Americans greater input over law-enforcement guideline reforms offers one potential route toward addressing issues tied to police brutality and misconduct. Yet such an approach taps into long-standing debates about how to apportion power and influence in the policymaking process. Should a principle of formal procedural equality govern this process, with different groups in society receiving influence proportionate to their demographic weight (Clifford 2012; Dahl 1971)? Or should influence be proportional to the impact of the problem on a given group (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010; Mansbridge 2003)? In this manuscript, we used a survey experiment of US adults to discern how the public thinks about these issues. We showed that group-related concerns, as opposed to generalized principles, drive peoples’ responses to the pursuit of substantive (over procedural) input equality. Democrats and respondents with positive attitudes toward African Americans reported substantially better evaluations of a proposal to grant disproportionate influence to the African-American community and of the politician making it. Republicans and those with negative attitudes toward this social group, on the other

---

9 The interaction between attitudes toward African Americans and the consultation treatment also remains significant and in the same direction.
hand, reported substantially worse evaluations. Strikingly, however, differences in respondents’ procedural preferences largely transcend variation in the partisanship of the politician proposing the consultation.

These findings have important implications for African American-police relations, theories of procedural fairness, and accounts of partisan influence over mass attitudes. First, on the specific case at hand: our research aligns with a long line of work suggesting the centrality of race in perceptions of the police, the use of deadly force, and police misconduct (Cullen et al. 1996; Nadal et al. 2017; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). We build on these findings by suggesting that attempts to rectify this situation through a move toward more “democratic” policing (Sklansky 2005) are themselves tainted by divisions in racial resentment – an observation which may help to explain variation in the use of these measures across the US (Walker 2016). To a certain extent, we can understand these findings through the rubric of differences in preferred policy output: we may expect greater opposition to proposals to give greater voice to African-Americans insofar as respondents assume that doing so will produce disagreeable policy outcomes. Yet, this is only a part of the story. After all, we find treatment effects not only on attitudes toward the proposal, but also toward the politician proposing and holding the consultation. In addition, if assumptions about policy output were driving results, we would expect the proposing politician’s partisanship to play a much greater role in driving attitudes than it did here, given partisan divisions on the issue and in the American mass public as a whole (Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018; Swain 2018). This suggests that opposition to more “democratic” policing may stem as much from generalized feelings toward African Americans as it does from beliefs about the policy consequences of such a move.
Second, research on procedural fairness suggests that decision procedures that give equal weight to societal groups should be judged as fairer than those where input is unequally divided. Yet our results highlight the importance of considering the group being granted voice. Political contests are inherently *inter-group* affairs that motivate people to evaluate policies, and the politicians that offer them, according to their congruence with broader group interests and motives (Conover 1988; Huddy 2013). The specific groups involved in a “procedurally fair” versus “procedurally unfair” counterfactual should thus deeply matter for how people react to those procedures. As such, our research is consonant with the literature on political tolerance, which highlights that people may tend to sacrifice generalized norms when informed of the precise groups that will benefit or be harmed by a decision (Grant and Rudolph 2003; Petersen et al. 2011; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1983). It also aligns with recent work suggesting that voters may be more inclined to move away from majority-rule procedures when vulnerable minorities are involved (DeScioli and Bokemper n.d.). Yet, insofar as these minority groups elicit different reactions among different segments of the electorate, the downside is that increasingly strained inter-group dynamics are likely to stoke case-by-case disagreement on even basic questions of democratic governance. Nevertheless, more work is clearly needed to fully untangle how social groups – which are central to politics – influence people’s interactions with decision procedures, fair or otherwise.

Third, our results also matter for broader theories of partisan influence. Partisans tend to follow the positions of their co-partisan elites, but what drives this influence is a question of ongoing debate (Fowler 2018; Leeper and Slothuus 2014). We found that partisans were more willing to allow a deviation from the equality principle when a co-partisan advocated it, which at first glance fits with the view that partisans “blindly” follow the leader, even when it conflicts
with underlying interests and values. However, in subsequent analyses we showed that the effects of co-partisanship were masking a more important deviation between partisans in the experiment: Democrats and Republicans largely disregarded co-partisanship and paid attention to the specific contents of the consultation proposal. This pattern is consistent with results reported by Nicholson (2011), which suggested that party endorsement cues were much less powerful influences on policy attitudes than information about the specific group benefiting from the policy at hand. Our results may thus add some additional support for an alternative understanding of party identification, whereby partisan sorting is itself based on other group allegiances (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004; Mason and Wronski 2018; Robison and Moskowitz n.d.). From this perspective, party endorsements primarily serve as information shortcuts for assessing the wisdom of a policy based on what they signal about the policy’s consequences for party-associated social groups (Converse 1964; Petersen, Slothuus, and Togeby 2010). Party influence is thus not unbounded or “blind”, but rather substantive and responsive to information (Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014; Bullock 2011). Our evidence is more consistent with this alternative perspective, suggesting that pessimistic accounts of elite influence of mass opinion may be overly negative.
References


DeScioli P and Bokemper SE (n.d.) Intuitive Political Theory: People’s Judgments about How Groups Should Decide. *Political Psychology*.


Goldman SK (2017) Explaining White Opposition to Black Political Leadership: The Role of


Swain RD (2018) Negative Black Stereotypes, Support for Excessive Use of Force by Police,


Supplementary Materials for

Who Should Get a Say?
Race, Law Enforcement Guidelines, and Systems of Representation

Contents
- **Table OA1**: Descriptive statistics for sample compared to 2016 ANES
- **Table OA2**: Respondent Partisanship Moderates Treatment Effects Alongside Race Attitudes
- **Table OA3**: Respondent Partisanship Moderates Treatment Effects Alongside Race Attitudes (White Respondents)
- **Figure OA1**: Predicted Values of Consultation by Respondent Partisanship Based on Tables OA2 & OA3
### Table OA1. Sample Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>ANES 2016 (Weighted)</th>
<th>ANES 2016 (Unweighted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Identification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean PID</td>
<td>3.92 (2.18)</td>
<td>3.82 (SE: 0.04)</td>
<td>3.86 (2.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Dem</td>
<td>42.27</td>
<td>45.98</td>
<td>45.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Ind</td>
<td>17.47</td>
<td>14.67</td>
<td>13.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Rep.</td>
<td>40.27</td>
<td>39.35</td>
<td>40.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PID Extremity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.88 (1.10)</td>
<td>2.86 (SE: 0.02)</td>
<td>2.87 (1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Ind.</td>
<td>17.47</td>
<td>14.67</td>
<td>13.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Lean</td>
<td>15.69</td>
<td>22.02</td>
<td>23.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Not Strong</td>
<td>27.91</td>
<td>25.65</td>
<td>25.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Strong</td>
<td>38.93</td>
<td>37.66</td>
<td>37.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1-5 Scale)</td>
<td>(1-7 Scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean General Ideology</td>
<td>3.05 (1.14)</td>
<td>4.17 (SE: 0.03)</td>
<td>4.18 (1.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Liberal</td>
<td>29.49</td>
<td>31.54</td>
<td>31.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Moderate</td>
<td>36.15</td>
<td>27.15</td>
<td>27.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Conservative</td>
<td>34.36</td>
<td>41.31</td>
<td>41.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Racial Attitudes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-Americans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling Thermometer</td>
<td>68.09 (27.24)</td>
<td>68.93 (SE: 0.46)</td>
<td>68.44 (21.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Feeling</td>
<td>64.42 (29.24)</td>
<td>74.61 (SE:0.55)</td>
<td>75.48 (22.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.&quot;</td>
<td>3.43 (1.24)</td>
<td>3.47 (SE:0.03)</td>
<td>3.46 (1.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.&quot;</td>
<td>3.08 (1.38)</td>
<td>3.01 (SE:0.03)</td>
<td>3.00 (1.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.'</td>
<td>3.00 (1.31)</td>
<td>3.25 (SE:0.03)</td>
<td>3.63 (1.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White (~Hispanic)</td>
<td>74.67</td>
<td>69.17</td>
<td>71.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black (~Hispanic)</td>
<td>11.16</td>
<td>10.92</td>
<td>9.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>11.89</td>
<td>10.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+ Races</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>35-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.62</td>
<td>17.73</td>
<td>16.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>16.62</td>
<td>15.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three racial resentment items are scaled 1-5 and coded so that higher scores indicate greater ‘resentment’
Table OA2. Respondent Partisanship Moderates Treatment Effects Alongside Race Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. American</td>
<td>-0.962***</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
<td>-0.237***</td>
<td>0.00253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Respondent</td>
<td>-1.164***</td>
<td>-0.417</td>
<td>-0.385***</td>
<td>-0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes toward African Americans</td>
<td>-0.481***</td>
<td>0.333**</td>
<td>-0.211***</td>
<td>0.0528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent Ideology</td>
<td>-0.0960</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>-0.0619*</td>
<td>-0.0662**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Thermometer</td>
<td>0.0115***</td>
<td>0.0120***</td>
<td>0.00284**</td>
<td>0.00301***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. American # Democrat</td>
<td>2.350***</td>
<td>0.832**</td>
<td>0.757***</td>
<td>0.266**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. American # Attitudes toward African Americans</td>
<td>-1.602***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.0342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.744***</td>
<td>5.361***</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.0342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1758</td>
<td>1758</td>
<td>1758</td>
<td>1758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Models are OLS. Attitudes toward African Americans is an index (M=0, SD=1) wherein higher scores indicate more negative evaluations. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Table OA3. Respondent Partisanship Moderates Treatment Effects Alongside Race Attitudes (White Respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. American</td>
<td>-1.171*** (0.204)</td>
<td>-0.312 (0.216)</td>
<td>-0.313*** (0.0704)</td>
<td>-0.0328 (0.0750)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>-1.247*** (0.245)</td>
<td>-0.493* (0.250)</td>
<td>-0.410*** (0.0847)</td>
<td>-0.164 (0.0866)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes toward African Americans</td>
<td>-0.510*** (0.0887)</td>
<td>0.278* (0.118)</td>
<td>-0.216*** (0.0306)</td>
<td>0.0415 (0.0410)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.0496 (0.0852)</td>
<td>-0.0711 (0.0825)</td>
<td>-0.0426 (0.0294)</td>
<td>-0.0496 (0.0286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Thermometer</td>
<td>0.00835** (0.00309)</td>
<td>0.00870** (0.00299)</td>
<td>0.00206 (0.00107)</td>
<td>0.00217* (0.00104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. American # Dem</td>
<td>2.544*** (0.303)</td>
<td>1.015** (0.333)</td>
<td>0.867*** (0.105)</td>
<td>0.368** (0.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consults: Afr. American # Attitudes toward African Americans</td>
<td>-1.563*** (0.162)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.510***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.918*** (0.385)</td>
<td>5.526*** (0.374)</td>
<td>0.154 (0.133)</td>
<td>0.0256 (0.130)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 1350 1350 1350 1350
Adjusted $R^2$: 0.080 0.140 0.104 0.155

Models are OLS. Attitudes toward African Americans is an index (M=0, SD=1) wherein higher scores indicate more negative evaluations. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Figure OA1: Predicted Values of Consultation by Respondent Partisanship Based on Tables OA2 & OA3

Notes: Markers provide predicted values on the outcome variables by respondent partisanship and condition (y-axis). Left-hand sub-graphs stem from Models 2 & 4 in Table OA2 (and hence the full sample), while right-hand subgraphs stem from Models 2 & 4 in Table OA3 (and hence just white respondents).